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THC: SllPRFME COllRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.J/\J'f: IJF llTAH,
Plaintitf-Respondent,

-vP.l\llJ

Case No.

19281

BRIAN TllC'KEP,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant,
aiJ<Jravated robbery,
Ann. §

Paul Brian Tucker, was charged with
a

first degree felony,

under Utah Code

76-6-302 (1978).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery after
a Jury

trial on May 10, 1983.

indeterminate term of not

He was then sentenced to the

less than five years to life in the

lllah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the

judgment and sentence of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Early on the morning of February 18, 1983, Larry
lllrleffi and Perry Georges were returning to their rooms at
the

Little Americil Motel at 500 south and Main Street in

Salt Lake City
well

ligrted,

(T.
Mr.

6).
Rirleffi

heard sumeth1n,J

He turned to see what or who was mak
handgun pointed at his face (T. 6).
holding the gun,

had a

and demanded that Mr.
10).

Mr.

Birleffi

heh1nd him (T.

the

ncq se and

Ap;>ellant,

bandana over the

the person

lower part of his

7, 8).

Mr. Birleffi watched appellant run

he

The police car at the intersection
Salt Lake County Sheriff's deputies

(T.

(T.

8).

belonged to two

47).

After appellant

ran in front of the patrol car on 500 South and then

on foot.

the

towards the

intersection, where a pol;ce car happened to

Little America,

6,

Refore

entering Little America to contact the police about

the sidewalk and

face

into his pockets and gave appellant

all the money he had -- about $21.00 (T.

robbery,

f•Jund a

Birleffi give him all his money (T.

reached

61.

back to

into the shrubbery on the north side of
the two deputies stopped and pursued appellant

They momentarily lost sight of him in the shrubs,

but saw him emerge from the bushes further to the west and run
back across 500 south (T.

48-50).

One of the officers

followed him into an alley, where she lost sight of him (T.

5 2).

However, while the pursuit was

in progress, Officer

Robert Dortch of the Salt Lake Police Department's vice squad
came along and after observing the situation,
pursuit (T. 87).
and

joined in the

Officer Dortch chased appellant

briefly lost sight of him,

in the alley

but continued running

same direction until he arrived at a vacant

-2-

lot

(T.

in the
88).

1Jff1cer Dortch scannerl the vacant

lot with his flashlight and

appellant, who ducked when the light fell upon him.
The officer drew his revolver,

informed appellant that he was

a police officer, and then approached him (T. 89).
who was dressed

Appellant,

very much like the man Officer Dortch had been

chasing, was perspiring and exhibiting a rapid pulse (T.
8g-%).

A search of appellant subsequent to his arrest

uncovered a
(T.

72,

bandana with a knot tied in it and $21.00 in cash

73).

Shortly after appellant had been arrested, police
arrived with Mr.

Birleffi and Mr. Georges, who identified

appellant as the person who had robbed Mr. Birleffi.
of

A search

the shrubre ry near Little America yielded a handgun that

fit the description given by Mr. Birleffi (T. 58).
Approximately three weeks after the incident, Mr.
Birlef fi

picked appellant from an eight man lineup and

identified appellant as the man who had robred him.
identified appellant in court as the robber (T.
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He also

9, 12, 15).

AP 1.

1.r-...i

PC>]

r

'J

NT

APPELLANT'S FA! LllRI T(l FOi I ()\'O i'l!lli'l-1'
PROCEDllRF:S FOR •>'1.llC1H,1; T\I l·ll<i<Y
BIRLEFFI'S IUr:NTIFICArJ1lN
PRECLUDE:S
r•:' \l'l'f'l\L ell-'
APPELLANT'S ARGllMf'J'i !'HA.T T!ll 'JTSTl MONY
SHOULD HAVr: RF:EN SllPI•PrSSf[);
ALTF:RNATIVELY, ADM!Sc-I11N •IF Tl!AT TFST!MONY
DID NOT DENY ,\PPELI.A:--JT 11: 1f l'f,'(J('r:ss rw LAW.

Relying
(1972), appellant

ar<Jues that the

lot where he was

Hiygers,

409 U.S.

188

showup irlentification

in his case (i.e.,

procedure used
in the vacant

largely rm Ned v.

irlentification of appellant

founrl

sh<Jrt 1 y after the

robbery) was impermissibly suggestive an(i therefore Larry
Rirleffi's testimony concerning his showup identification of
appellant and his subsequent
appellant

have
There

beeel suppressed.

is nothing

appellant objected,

lineup identification of

in the record

by way of either a pretrial motion to

suppress or a specific obJecti"n at
identification testiri.J'l}
these circumstances,

Utah,

trial,

to the showup

he now challenges on appeal.

Under

appellant has waiverl any alleged error

concerning the admission of
John,

to inrlicate that

that testimony.

See State v.

667 P.2d 32 (1983), citing Rule 12, lltah Rules of

Criminal Procedure (Utah C<)rle Ann.
State v. Mccardell, lltcih,

apparently marle no pretrial
identification testimony,

77-35-12 ( 1982)), and

6S.-'. P.! l 942
1

(19H21.

Appellant

rnr·t l''n t<J suppress the

as req•Jired
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lineup

rcy Rule 12(b)(2), Utah

''""
,!

Criminal Procedure, and therefore he has waived any

1ecl inn to the admission of that testimony.

f'llr·t

I

,,f

State v. John.

ht'rm"re, althouyh at trial appellant objected to the

11><·"<' testimony on foundational grounds, he did not object to

it''"

the

specific grounrls he now argues on appeal.

The

, "nt1,·1cporaneous objection rule requires timely and specific
"hJt•<.'t ion at trial

to admission of evidence in order for the

'1uest ion of admissibility to be considered on appeal.
v.

Mccardell,

652 P.2d at 947.

State

For this Court to consider a

defendant's objection to the admission of evidence at trial,
tht' defendant must have specifically stated to the trial court
the same yrounds for objection he presents on appeal.
see also State v.
at p.

11

Davis, Utah,

Ibid.

No. 18892, slip op.

(decided June 25, 1984).

In light of this rule,

appellant's assignment of error concerning the admission of
the lineup identification testimony should not be considered
by this Court on appeal.
Even if this Court decides to consider appellant's
assignment of error concerning the admission of Larry
Rirleffi's identification testimony, the testimony was
properly admitted.

Contrary to appellant's claim, the showup

1clentification procedure employed in his case was not "so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of
Un1te<i States,

irreparable misidentification."
390 U.S.

377, 384 (1968).
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Simmons v.

In State v. Mccumber, Utah, fi22 P. 2r1 353 ( lqRll),
this Court adopted the standarrls set forth in Neil v. Higgers
and other related United States Supreme Court decisions for
determining whether an identification procerlure gives rise to
a substantial likelihood of misidentification:
Police identification procedures such
as photograph displays, lineups, showups,
and the like, do not deny the accused due
process of law unless, under a totality of
the circumstances, they are so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification as to
deny the accused a fair trial.
[Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).J
Where an
identification procedure, even though
suggestive, does not give rise to a
substantial likelihood of
misidentification, no due process
violation has occurred.
[Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188 (1972).]
In determining the
re1iability of the identification under
the totality of the circumstances, the
court must also consider the opportunity
of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, the witness' degree of
attention, the accuracy of any prior
description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated during the
identification procedure, and the time
the crime and the identification.
[Neil v. Biggers, supra; Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977),]
622 P.2d at 357.

Acknowledging that the victim of an

attempted rape and aggravated sexual assault "had a very
limited opportunity to observe her assailant"

in that "[h]er

view of his face was very brief, and occurred in a darkened
room immediatley after she had awakened from sleep,"
Mccumber Court also said:

-6-

the

Such factors, however, although they may
weaken the probative impact of the
evidence offered, do not mandate
suppression of the evidence in the name of
due process without some showing that the
identification procedures were themselves
imperrnissibly suggestive.
622 P.2d at 357.
In applying these tests to the present case, it
becomes apparent that, under the totality of the
circumstances, there was not a substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification:
A.

Opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime.

Although Mr. Birleffi was face to face with
appellant

for only 15 to 20 seconds during the robbery, he

observed appellant in a well lighted area and was able to note
certain of appellant's characteristics as appellant fled,
particularly his clothing and his frizzy hair (T. 8, 10).
B.

Degree of attention.

Mr. Birleffi admitted that during the robbery, he
initially focused on the gun pointed in his face.

However,

his attention shifted to appellant, with whom he was
face-to-face, and he carefully observed appellant during, and
moments after, the robbery (T. 8, 10).

-7-

C.

Accuracy of prior rlescripti"n·

This prong of the Mccumber/Biggers test
over by appellant.

is qlossed

He virtually ignores the victim's

testimony about the description of the rubber the victim gave
to the police

(T.

10).

That description, which Mr.

made prior to viewing appellant
fit appellant

(T.

Birleffi

in police custody, definitely

98).

D.

Level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness during the identification
procedure.

Mr.

Birleffi's certainty in identifying appellant as

the robter was well established.

After seeing appellant at

the location where police had apprehended him,
told police, "That is the fella"

(T.

13).

Birleffi easily identified appellant

in a

Mr.

Birleffi

Moreover, Mr.
lineup of eight men

conducted approxiamtely three weeks after the robbery.

An

in-court identification also was made.
E. Length of time between the crime and
the identification.
Little more than 20 minutes had passed
time of the robtery and the time of the

12).

It is

between the

identification (T.

likely that Mr. Birleffi, with the memory of the

robtery still fresh,

had

in his mind a vivid

image of the

robber when he identified appellant.
As noted
580 P.2d 601

by th is Court

(1978),

in State v. Clemons, Utah,

showups are useful

-8-

in effectively

<·nf,,rciny the criminal law:
The idea of taking the victim
forthwith to identify a suspect is of
value to the detained person if he is
innocent; and while the matter is fresh in
mind, it assists the victim in determining
whether a suspect is or is not the
perpetrator of the offense.
580 P.2d at 602.

The instant case is similar to Clemons and

other cases where one person showups have been held proper.
Banks v. State, Nev., 575 P.2d 592 (1978); State v.
Arnold,

2fi Ariz. App. 542,

Nevertheless,

549 P.2d 1060 (1976).

appellant suggests that because he was

handcuffed and clearly in police custody when the showup
identification occurred, the identification procedure was
impermissibly suggestive.

However, those facts alone are not

sufficient to render the procedure impermissibly suggestive.
See State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 442, 443, 511 P.2d 159, 160
(1973), where this Court held that "[i]t was entirely proper
to have the victims see the
police]."

[suspects]

being detained

[by the

Although probably suggestive, the showup procedure

used, when tested against the standards set forth in Biggers
and adopted in Mccumber, did not give rise to a substantial
likelihood of misidentification.
P.2d

See State v. Bingham, Utah,

, No. 18774, slip op. at pp. 2-3 (June 13, 1984).

c;iven this, appellant's further argument that Mr. Birleffi's
testimony concerning the lineup identification should not have
been al lowed in -- an argument

based solely on appellant's

-9-

contention that the "tainted" showup iclentification rc>nc1ered
the subsequent lineup identification unreliable -- is
similarly without merit.

In sum, the identification

procedures used in this case did not deprive appellant of due
process of law, and, therefore, Mr. Birleffi's identification
testimony was properly admitted.

POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.
requested jury instruction on eyewitness
identification (R.

29-30) is modeled after that recommended in

United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
This Court has repeatedly held that a "Telfaire" instruction
is not mandatory in all instances where eyewitness
identification is crucial to the case.

Instead, the decision

of whether to give a Telfaire instruction is discretionary
with the trial court.

See State v. Bingham, Utah,

P.2d

No. 18774 (decided June 13, 1984); State v. Reedy, Utah, 681
P.2d 1251 (1984); State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982).
As noted in Bingham:
Jury instructions must be considered as a
whole.
"When taken as a whole if they
fairly tender the case to the Jury, the
fact that one or more of the instructions,
standing alone, are not as full or
accurate as they might have been is not
reversible error." State v. Brooks, Utah,
638 P.2d 537, 542 (1981) (citation
omitted).

-10-

:; 1 1 p op.

at p . 1 •
The trial court's instructions in appellant's case

(see, particularly, Instructions No. 3, 6, and 12

(R.

45, 47,

53)) fully informed the jury that the State had the burden of
proving every element of the offense charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Instruction No. 10 (R. 51) instructed the

jurors that they were the sole judges of the credibility of
the witnesses and set forth specific guidelines for
determining a witness's credibility.

As in Bingham, the

instructions, taken as a whole, "adequately advised the jury
on the law pertaining to this case."

Bingham, slip op. at p.

4, citing State v. Schaffer, Utah, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1981).
Significantly, two eyewitnesses (i.e., Mr. Birleffi and Perry
Georges (T. 33-46)) positively identified appellant as the
robber; and there was additional physical evidence linking
appellant to the crime (i.e., the bandana and the $21 cash
found on appellant's person at the time of his arrest).

Thus,

this does not appear to be the kind of case identified by
Justice Durham in her concurring opinion in State v. Newton,
Utah, 681 P.2d 833 (1984), where "an instruction on the
dangers of eyewitness identification is most appropriate."
6Rl P.2d at 834.

-11-

Pf>I"lT
THE PROSECUTOR'S
ARGUMENT DID NOT
ERROR.

I I I

COMMENTS IN HIS CLOSING
CONST I TllTF: REVERSI RLF:

Appellant argues that certain statements made by the
prosecutor in his closing argument

to the 1ury (see T. 108)

amounted to improper comment on appellant's decision not to
testify and thus constituted reversible error.

However, even

if those statements can be construed as a direct reference to
appellant's not taking the stand, any error was harmless.
Eliciting evidence of a defendant's decision to
exercise his or her constitutional right to remain silent, or
prosecutorial comment thereon, may violate a defendant's right
against self-incrimination.

Doyle v. Ohio, 42fi U.S. 610

(1976); Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609 (1965); State v.

Hales, Utah, 652 P.2d 1290 (1982); State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639
P.2d 146 (1981).

In Wiswell,

this Court stressed that it was

the prosecutor's repeated efforts to elicit testimony about
the defendant's post-arrest silence and his comment thereon in
final argument that resulted
See Wiswell, 639 P.2d at 147.

in prejudice to the defendant.
However,

it was implied in

Wiswell and expressed more clearly in State v. Hales, 652 P.2d
at 1292, that evidence of or comment on a defendant's silence
does not automatically result

in prejudicial error.

Curative

instructions, for instance, are an important consideration for
reviewing courts.

See Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292.

-12-

Also, Wiswell

1n11,l 1ed
1;;

that if the improper evidence or prosecutorial comment

not extensive, reversible error may not result.
639 P.2d at 147-148,

of C.J. Hall.
trial

See

including the dissenting opinion

Finally, prompt, ameliorative reaction by the

Judge to the allegedly improper prosecutorial comment

generally will prevent prejudice to the defendant.
Utah, 540 P.2d 949 (1975),

See State

including the concurring

opinion of J. Maughan.
It is not at all clear that the brief comments made
by the prosecutor,

to which appellant objects, were a direct

reference to appellant's silence.

But even assuming they

were, the comments were not extensive, and immediately after
the comments were made, the trial judge twice admonished the
jury and the prosecutor that the burden was on the State to
prove appellant's guilt (T. 108).

Moreover, the trial court's

instructions made clear that appellant had the right not to
take the stand, that no adverse inferences should be drawn
from appellant's decision not to testify, and that the State
had the

burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

appellant was guilty of the crime charged (see Instructions
No.

3, 6, 11 (R.

45, 47, 52)).

Under these circumstances, if

the prosecutor's comments were error, such was harmless,

in

that even without the error there was not "a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant."
State v. Fontana, Utah, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (1984), quoting
state v. Hutchison, Utah, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (1982).

-13-

See also
-----

Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal

(Utah rode .\nn,

77-35-30 (1982)1; State v. Smith, lltah, 675 P.2d 'i21
(holding that although the prosecut(1r's remarks
argument were improper,

(1YH3)

in closing

they were harmless).

CONCLUSION
Because appellant

failed to follow proper procedures

for suppression of the identification testimony he now
challenges on appeal,
should have

the

issue of whether that testimony

been suppressed has not

been preserved for appeal.

Even if this Court were to consider that issue, admission of
the testimony did not deny appellant due process of law.
Further, the trial court's refusal to give
appellant's requested eyewitness identification instruction to
the

jury was

in conformity with this Court's recent decisions

concerning "Telfaire" instructions.
prosecutor's remarks

And finally,

the

in closinq argument were, at most,

harmless error.
RESPECTFULLY sut:rnitted this

/C

-tt;day of

August,

19 84.

L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DA\lf' fl. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
c'>pies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to James C.
f<rc;clc"liaw,

Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender

Assn., 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
August, 1984.

